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Abstract 
We examine the strategic rationale for terrorist tactics in civil war. We identify conditions 
that favor terrorism as a tactic in armed civil conflicts as well as the specific targets as a 
function of rebel characteristics, goals, and government responses to political demands. 
Terrorist tactics can be helpful as an instrument to coerce the government in asymmetric 
conflicts, as rebels are typically weak relative to the government. But terrorism can also 
help communicate the goals and resolve of a group when there is widespread uncertainty. 
We consider the strategic importance and rationale for terrorism in terms of the frequency 
of attacks and specific targets, and analyze our propositions using new data linking actors 
from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data and the Global Terrorism Database. 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that terrorism is used more extensively in civil 
conflicts by weaker groups and when attacks can help the group convey its goals without 
undermining popular support. Groups with more inclusive audiences are more likely to 
focus on ‘hard’ or official targets, while groups with more sectarian audiences are more 
likely to attack ‘soft’ targets and civilians.  
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Introduction 
Terrorism and civil war have traditionally been studied in separation, by different 
scholarly communities and following distinct approaches. Although some scholars search 
for mutually exclusive definitions to differentiate terrorism and conventional attacks, 
others point to how terrorism in the sense of indirect violent targeting is common in many 
armed civil conflicts (e.g., Asal et al., 2012; de la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2015; 
Sánchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009). There is a growing interest in the overlap between 
civil war and terrorist tactics (e.g., Findley & Young, 2012; Fortna, 2015; Stanton, 2013). 
But since much of the existing research has focused on quantifying the degree of overlap 
or use of terrorism in a binary fashion, we still lack explanations for variation, or why 
some armed conflicts see extensive use of terrorist tactics while others have no or only 
sporadic use. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) made 
extensive use of terrorism, while the Restoration Council of the Shan State in Myanmar 
has not conducted any terrorist attacks in a rebellion lasting over a decade. Furthermore, 
organizations use terrorist violence in different ways in civil wars. For example, about 
90% of all terrorist attacks claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013 
were against ‘soft’ civilian targets, while other organizations in the conflict such as the 
Free Syrian Army primarily carried out attacks against ‘hard’ official targets and rarely 
targeted civilians (36%,).1 
We apply an actor-oriented approach to these puzzles, focusing on the motivations 
and incentives for rebels to resort to terrorism as a supplement to conventional attacks in 
                                                            
1 These proportions are calculated from the Global Terrorism Database, using a typology 
of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ targets explained later.  
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conflicts as well as the limiting factors that make terrorism less attractive. We argue that 
terrorist attacks serve a dual purpose, and help rebels coerce the government and 
communicate their goals and resolve to the government and their target audiences. We 
relate the choice of terrorist tactics and specific targets to group resources, government 
responses, and group ideologies in terms of goals and audiences. We present new data 
identifying the organizations that carry out terrorist attacks during civil conflicts, and 
conduct a group-based analysis of the frequency of terrorist attacks and the specific 
targets, covering all groups in civil conflicts. Contrary to many common arguments that 
see terrorism simply as a weapon of the militarily weak or as indiscriminate attacks on soft 
civilian targets (e.g., Crenshaw, 1981; Lane, 2010), we show that motives and audiences 
generate dramatically different attack patterns, and that groups are more likely to use 
terrorism when attacks can help raise their profile and groups can justify attacks, even if 
they may harm non-combatants. Groups with more inclusive audiences tend to focus on 
terrorist attacks against ‘hard’ or official targets, while groups with more restricted or 
sectarian audiences are more likely to attack ‘soft’ targets and undefended civilians.  
Despite the extensive separate literatures on civil wars and terrorism, there has 
been limited attention to the relationship between the two. The concept of terrorism itself 
remains contested, but many common definitions highlight terrorism as a specific tactic 
where non-state actors target opponents indirectly rather than through direct conventional 
attacks (e.g., Sandler, 2014: 257). 2  Conventional definitions of armed civil conflict 
                                                            
2  One survey records over 200 definitions of terrorism (Schmid & Jongman, 2005). 
Alternative definitions stress elements such as the intention to spread fear or targeting 
non-combatants. We see the focus on indirect targeting as most appropriate, but also 
consider sensitivity to alternative definitions in our analysis.  
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emphasize armed conflict between governments and a non-state group over an 
incompatibility with battle deaths beyond a threshold (see, e.g., Gleditsch et al., 2002; 
Sambanis, 2004).3 Terrorism thus differs from conventional attacks in civil conflicts in 
that the immediate targets or victims are typically non-combatants, and each individual 
victim is normally less important than the purpose of conveying a message to the intended 
audience. However, terrorism and civil war are clearly not mutually exclusive phenomena 
under these definitions. 
Existing research suggests a number of reasons why groups may use terrorist 
attacks as supplement to conventional attacks in civil war. Terrorism can be helpful to 
coerce the government, to intimidate or control the non-combatant population, as well as 
to outbid competing rebel groups.4 Terrorism can have various tactical advantages and is 
generally considered a useful weapon of the weak (Crenshaw, 1981).5 Researchers such as 
Eck & Hultman (2007) and Wood (2010) show that rebels become more likely to kill 
civilians as they are losing battles and the government also targets civilians. Bloom (2004) 
highlights the incentives to use terrorism arising from competition between Palestinian 
                                                            
3  Some restrict the term civil war to severe intrastate conflicts with more than 1000 
cumulative battledeaths. In line with previous research we use civil war in a less restricted 
sense, and consider all armed civil conflicts involving more than 25 deaths per year in our 
empirical analysis.  
4 Spoiling in peace processes is another important motivation (see Findley & Young, 
2012), but this is less relevant for ongoing civil wars. 
5 Some question this claim. Fortna (2015) finds that weaker groups in civil war are not 
more likely to use terrorism, while de la Calle & Sanchez Cuenca (2015) argue that resort 
to terrorism arises from the inability to control territory. 
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groups. Other researchers have looked at incentives to use terrorism during civil war in 
terms of the consequences for outcomes. Thomas (2014) argues that rebel groups who 
carry out terrorist attacks are more likely to be granted negotiations and concessions by 
the government. Stanton (2013) focuses on how democratic institutions can encourage 
terrorism as the government becomes more sensitive to the costs of violence and hence 
potentially more susceptible to coercion.  
Much of the existing research has used countries or conflicts as units of analysis 
(e.g., Findley & Young, 2012), neglecting organizations. Yet, merely showing an overlap 
in time and space during conflicts does not tell us whether terrorist attacks are carried out 
by the main organizations in conflict or unrelated groups. 6  Studies focusing on 
organizations have been limited to binary measures of terrorism use/non-use, neglected 
variation over time, or only considered organizations using terrorism without an explicit 
comparison with rebel groups who do not resort to terrorism (e.g., Fortna, 2015; Stanton, 
2010; de la Calle & Sanchez Cuenca, 2015). Binary measures of use/non-use are not well-
suited to evaluate the relative importance of terrorism as a strategy, and tell us little about 
the specific attack patterns groups choose and their relationship with the overall activity of 
the group. Studies of targeting have been limited to lethal violence against civilians (e.g., 
Eck & Hultman, 2007; Wood, 2010), and neglected the frequency of attacks against 
official targets and non-lethal attacks.  
                                                            
6 For example, India sees many attacks by groups such as the Tamil Liberation Army not 
related to a civil war, and attacks can also be carried out by groups opposing rebels, such 
as death squads in El Salvador. A narrow focus on geographic overlap excludes all actions 
by rebel organizations outside the conflict zone, such as Chechen attacks in Moscow.  
 7 
 
Our study differs from existing research on terrorism and civil war by the actor-
oriented focus on how group characteristics account for variation in the potential benefits 
and costs of terrorist tactics relative to conventional attacks. Using time-varying data on 
terrorist attack frequency and relative rebel strength we show that weaker groups employ 
terrorist tactics more frequently in civil conflicts. We also focus on how the nature of 
support for the groups determines targeting strategies and the choice between soft vs. hard 
and official targets, through influencing the legitimacy or costs of attacking soft civilian 
targets. Hence, we consider both the quantity and quality of terrorist violence in civil 
conflicts (see Conrad & Greene, 2015).  
 
Terrorism as a tactic in civil war 
We use a simple formal representation to motivate our propositions about group 
characteristics and the choice of specific strategies in conflict. Following Fearon (1995), 
the panels in Figure 1 provide a conventional spatial representation of an incompatibility 
between a government j and a non-state actor i. A division or outcome x closer to 1 (where 
the non-state actor i receives 1-x) is more favorable to the government j. A more favorable 
relative power p implies that an actor is more likely to do well in a conflict. Relative 
strength p can be considered in terms of contest success functions, or the expected 
outcome of a confrontation or the likely shift from the status quo q given p and the costs 
of conflict to the parties c (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1988).7 We represent the costs of conflict c 
                                                            
7 Contests can also be conceptualized as lottery where side j wins or loses the entire prize 
with a probability p, minus the cost of war (e.g., Fearon, 1995). The relative power p and 
costs of conflict c delimit a range of outcomes that should be preferable to a confrontation 
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subscripted for each actor around the expected outcome p, subtracting the costs for the 
government from the expected outcome p-cj and adding the costs of the non-state actor 
with the expected outcome 1-p+cj.  
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 1 in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 1: Bargaining, weak vs strong rebels and conventional military strategy m vs. 
terrorist strategy t 
 
This simple framework helps illustrate situations where a terrorist strategy t may 
be more or less helpful for a rebel group compared to a conventional military strategy m in 
terms of how p and c plausibly differ by tactics. We present four cases in Figure 1, 
distinguishing between a rebel group that is militarily relatively strong compared to the 
government (left column) and one that is relatively weak (right column), and use of 
conventional military tactics m (upper row) and terrorist tactic t (lower row). In general, 
actors will choose the strategies that maximize their chances of doing well in a contest, 
extract some form of concession from the opponent, or impose more significant costs on 
the opponent. Hence, terrorism may be a useful tactic in civil war if it can yield a higher p 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
as a costly exit option. We focus on cases where the actors are already involved in a civil 
war or direct confrontation, and do not seek to explain why the parties failed to reach an 
agreement in advance. 
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or increase the costs to the opponent cj, compared to direct conventional attacks. All else 
equal, one can think of ݌௠ for conventional tactics as a function of the expected military 
impact, defined by the ratio of government troops to all troops (i.e., rebels + 
governments), ignoring for simplicity relative efficacy. By contrast, ݌௧ for terrorist attacks 
is a function of planning and execution, less directly tied to group personnel and 
resources. Even small groups can carry out spectacular attacks, and there is no direct 
relationship between group size and attack severity, although larger groups carry out more 
attacks over their lifetime (see Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012).  
In Figure 1 there is a dramatic difference in ݌௠ for the stronger and the weaker 
group in the upper row, but no difference in ݌௧ for the stronger group. For the stronger 
group, ݌௠  < ݌௧   (i.e., more favorable to the non-state actor), and there are no obvious 
incentives to rely on terrorism. However, ݌௠ > ݌௧ for the weaker actor, since a non-state 
actor with limited resources to do well in a conventional battle against the government can 
successfully carry out covert operations or hit-and-run attacks against government forces, 
or terrorist attacks that draw attention. Terrorism can be also beneficial if covert 
operations can help minimize c or the costs of conflict to the non-state actor, by making it 
easier to evade government detection and retaliation, or if terrorist strategies inflict larger 
costs on the government than conventional attacks, for example by demonstrating the lack 
of control and undermining political support. In the lower right panel in Figure 1, the 
weaker non-state actor faces smaller costs under a terrorist strategy than a conventional 
military strategy, and terrorism imposes relatively higher costs on the government.8 
                                                            
8 In addition to the direct political costs to the government, terrorism can also impose 
significant economic costs and damages (see the survey by Enders & Sandler, 2008).  
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Beyond coercion of the government by threatening to inflict future harm, terrorist 
attacks as ‘deeds’ can also help a non-state actor communicate its goals and resolve to 
both the government and target audiences more effectively than ‘words’ or declarations. 
Civil wars are often asymmetric beyond military capabilities. Bargaining approaches 
highlight the role of private information and uncertainty in conflict (e.g., Fearon, 1995; 
Gartzke, 1999), and there is an important asymmetry in the information available to 
parties in civil war. In particular, the government typically knows less than the rebels 
about the opponent’s capabilities and resolve, and rebels can use terrorist tactics to 
demonstrate their ability and willingness to inflict harm. 
Although some accounts highlight the perceived indiscriminate nature of terrorism 
(Lane, 2010), groups tend to be highly selective and attack targets with a clear political 
rationale for the group and its audience, (e.g., Asal & Rethemeyer, 2008; Kalyvas, 2004). 
Most rebel groups need some degree of popular support or external financing to sustain 
their activities (Beardsley et al., 2015; Weinstein, 2007). Their goals and audience 
characteristics shape targeting decisions, as groups must avoid counterproductive effects 
arising from attacks that undermine potential support and legitimacy. Thus, the perceived 
costs and benefits of terrorism also depend on the specific targeting strategies.  
 
Terrorism frequency 
We proceed from the above conceptual framework on incentives and strategic advantages 
of terrorism in civil war to testable propositions on factors affecting the frequency of 
attacks by year. Our first proposition relates the incentives for attacks to the military 
strength of non-state actors. The relative strength p for conventional tactics clearly 
determines the likely advantage or disadvantage of terrorist tactics. Stronger rebel groups 
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are unlikely to use terrorist tactics intensively, as they can fight the government effectively 
using conventional military tactics (e.g., Cunningham et al., 2009). Moreover, as groups 
get stronger, their incentives change, and they are likely to be more concerned about 
suffering potentially counterproductive effects of terrorism. The costs of terrorist 
strategies, in particular the implications for popular support and in turn subsequent 
recruitment, may exceed the costs of conventional attacks. Groups that have an aspiration 
to garner support from a large audience and govern a territory must be more sensitive to 
the risk of alienating their own constituency (e.g., Beardsley et al., 2015; Stanton, 2013). 
This makes terrorism less attractive relative to conventional tactics, even if it can provide 
short-term advantages.  
In addition to military capabilities and the ability to carry out conventional attacks, 
government responses also shape the incentives of groups to use terrorism and the 
potential costs of terrorist tactics (e.g., Daxecker & Hess, 2013). Governments often 
respond harshly to perceived threats and use repression to increase the costs and deter 
dissent. However, repressive measures can increase the relative attractiveness of terrorism 
if conventional attacks become relatively more difficult compared to terrorist attacks (see 
Sandler et al., 1983). In terms of the parameters of the bargaining model, terrorism 
becomes more attractive for non-state actors as the relative costs of terrorist activities to 
conventional attacks decrease. Targeted repression against terrorist threats is difficult, 
given the covert nature of attacks, and indiscriminate repression can decrease popular 
support for the government and increase support for attacks on the government (see 
Kalyvas, 2004; Lichbach, 1987; Thomas, 2014). We thus expect that a history of 
government repression lowers the costs of terrorism for weaker rebel groups through 
providing greater popular support for selective terrorist attacks.   
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Jenkins’ (1975:15) famous quote that ‘terrorists want a lot of people watching, not 
a lot of people dead’ highlights how the publicity generated by spectacular attacks is often 
as important as the physical damage. Greater attention to the group increases the costs of 
conflict to the government, and can allow the group to recruit and improve its power. 
Although greater freedom and inclusion should decrease the motivation for violence (see 
Polo, 2015), a freer press also makes attacks more likely to be reported and increase the 
opportunities for non-state actors to spread fear and advertise their presence to the 
intended audience. Thus, we expect that greater press freedom makes terrorism a more 
effective strategy. Some people have noted that democracy can have a facilitating effect 
on the opportunities to organize terrorist attacks (e.g., Eubanks & Weinberg, 1994; Li, 
2005). However, press freedom is not synonymous with democratic institutions, and many 
states without fully competitive elections such as Egypt or restrictions on parties such as 
Turkey still have a relatively independent press (see Van Belle, 1997).  
 
Ideology and attack targets  
Beyond their effects on the advantages and costs of terrorist attacks relative to 
conventional military attacks, group characteristics also influence the likely specific 
targeting strategies. From a purely military point of view, ‘soft’ civilian targets with less 
protection and lower risk of confrontation with government forces may be easier than 
‘hard’ official targets. However, attacking civilians as a primary strategy can be 
counterproductive if rebels risk alienating potential supporters. As such, civilian targets 
would be less attractive than relatively harder targets with some direct symbolic 
association with government, even if the latter is more difficult to attack in a logistical 
sense.  
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The specific targets selected by groups are likely to reflect a tradeoff between 
relative ease of targets and their political logic. In the words of Gutierrez & Wood (2014: 
213), ideology entails ‘a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, 
the objectives pursued on behalf of that group, and a program of action’. Ideology shapes 
what constitutes meaningful and more counterproductive possible targets. Buhaug (2006) 
and Sobek and Payne (2010) show how civil wars with different incompatibilities and 
constituencies are driven by different risk factors and display different characteristics and 
dynamics. We argue that terrorist targeting follows a similar political logic, based on 
whether the goals and characteristics of the constituency provide rebels with a stronger or 
weaker rationale for hard-official and soft targets. 
The correspondence between the ideology of a group and its actions are related to 
both its potential strength p as well as the specific costs c of different types of actions or 
targets. In order to be viable, or preserve sufficient relative strength, rebels in a civil war 
must be able to recruit active participants (e.g., Clauset & Gleditsch, 2012). With regards 
to costs, ideology shapes the degree to which indirect targeting and indiscriminate 
violence can be seen as acceptable or illegitimate. One key mechanism is how the 
ideology and audience of a group shapes its ‘othering’, or to what degree civilian targets 
are deemed to be outside the constituency and therefore legitimate targets (e.g., Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008). 
Table IA relates the goals of groups in civil war (left column) to target audiences 
or constituencies (right column). We highlight a typology of incompatibilities similar to 
the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data distinction between challenges over the 
government or secessionist or autonomy claims for a territory (Gleditsch et al., 2002). In 
addition to goals, ideologies are also delineated by the constituency the group tries to 
reach out to or claims to act on behalf of (see Beardsley et al., 2015; Wucherpfenning et 
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al., 2012). Constituencies may be more or less inclusive, often defined by ethnic or 
religious markers. Given that some groups such as the Mozambican National Resistance 
(RENAMO) have elusive goals and unclear audiences we also allow for residual 
categories. 
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Table IA in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
 
Table IB presents a typology of common types identified in existing work on 
terrorism, based on the classification in the Terrorist Organizations’ Profiles (TOPs)9, 
explicitly identifying the goals and audiences in Table IA.  In general, we expect stronger 
othering for groups with sharper boundaries between their constituency and out-groups. 
This lowers the costs of terrorist attacks against civilians outside the audience as there is 
less risk of alienating potential supporters and undermining future recruitment. Groups 
with weaker othering or fluid boundaries have higher costs for violence against civilians, 
and indirect targeting is more likely against hard targets more closely associated with the 
government. From this general argument we can derive a number of more specific 
implications of the likely targets for different group profiles using terrorist tactics.  
 
                                                            
9 See http://www.start.umd.edu/tops/. 
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‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Table IB in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
Groups with a non-sectarian ideology that seek to take over the government 
normally have a large potential constituency. Inclusive claims entail weak othering, since 
there is no clear ‘out-group’, and it will be more difficult to justify attacks against 
civilians. We expect such groups to be more likely to attack official and harder target such 
as the government, police, and infrastructure to maximize material damage, but be careful 
in trying to avoid large casualties.10 Examples here include many leftist organizations such 
as the Salvadorean Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front and the Communist Party 
of India-Maoist.  
By contrast, secessionist and ethno-nationalist groups (including ethno-religious 
groups) focus specifically on advancing the interests of a specific communal group. This 
yields a much stronger othering against individuals associated with the government or its 
constituency. There is still a clear rationale for attacking hard-official targets, but rebels 
have more room to pursue coercion through soft targets as long as they can avoid 
victimizing the core constituency, and may thus prefer to select easier soft targets. 
Relevant examples here include the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey and the 
Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka (LTTE). 
                                                            
10 Miller (2007) examines how terrorist group objectives influence the effectiveness of 
countermeasures, and finds that government concessions tend to work better against 
separatists groups with limited demands. 
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Groups without a clear ideology and goals should be more likely to attack 
prevalently soft civilian targets. The absence of a specific constituency reduces notably the 
cost of civilian targeting in terms of undermining support. Groups in this category often 
receive support from foreign governments, as in the case of RENAMO, which make them 
beholden to the objectives of the foreign patron and more detached from domestic 
audiences (Salehyan et al., 2011), or rebels motivated by private benefits such as looting, 
such as the Revolutionary United Front (cf. Weinstein, 2007), and thus have fewer 
inhibitions against attacking civilians.  
Moreover, certain sectarian ideologies can be more permissive to soft targets. 
Religious ideology can provide strong othering against non-believers and displace guilt for 
actions justified by God (Bandura, 1990:164). Examples here include the Armed Islamic 
Group (GIA) in Algeria and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
The above discussion suggests a number of testable propositions on ideological 
profiles and the choice of hard and soft targets: 
 Rebel groups with a universalist political ideology and a large potential 
constituency – such as leftist, rightist, or groups seeking regime change – are more 
likely to predominantly attack hard and official targets. 
 Ethno-nationalist and ethno-religious rebel groups representing a specific 
community are less likely to attack predominantly hard and official targets than 
groups with a universalist ideology and audience.  
 Groups without a clear ideology and goals are more likely to attack prevalently 
soft civilian targets. 
 Religious groups are more likely to attack prevalently soft civilian targets. 
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Data and research design 
We construct a new actor-based dataset on terrorism in civil wars, relating organizations 
in the Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which 
we call ACD2GTD, which allow us to consider the characteristics and actions of 
individual groups and overcome the attributions problems that plague aggregated analyses 
of terrorism and civil war.11  We match all rebel groups involved in intrastate armed 
conflicts with any relevant terrorist organizations in GTD on a case-by-case basis. The 
matching only considers the specific years when groups are involved in a civil conflict 
that reaches the 25 battle-related deaths from the start of the GTD in 1970, and we 
disregard cases where groups perpetrate terrorist attacks in years outside civil conflict. 
Most group matches are straightforward, but some required additional research to 
establish actor correspondence. For example, the ACD sometimes uses generic names 
such as Kashmir Insurgents, while the GTD indicates specific organizations. In these cases 
we match all the terrorist events associated with these organizations to the ACD actor. Our 
approach is conservative in that we explicitly disregard cases where the GTD uses generic 
                                                            
11  Just as the concept itself, data on terrorism remain contested. The GTD data is 
considered by many the best available and most extensive data on domestic terrorism (see 
Enders et al., 2011). The main alternative, the RAND-MIPT data, only include domestic 
events after 1997. Some have expressed concerns about underreporting of events in GTD 
(see Sheehan, 2011), but this seems less problematic for attacks by actors in civil war. 
Others express concerns about divergent coding practices during phases (see 
http://tinyurl.com/z29pnzk). We conduct robustness test across phases, and our analyses 
do not include the period where over-reporting is considered most problematic (after 
November 2011).  
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names (e.g., Kurdish rebels or Muslim separatists) and the ACD identifies specific 
organizations. Moreover, we do not assume that unclaimed terrorist attacks are related to 
the rebels in a civil war, which risks inflating the number of related terrorist attacks.  
The final dataset encompass all non-state actors in the UCDP dataset for the years 
1970-2011 and comprise 394 unique rebel organizations and 1979 rebel group-years. We 
count both total attacks by year as well as the specific individual targets to distinguish 
‘hard-official’ and ‘soft’ targets. Almost 54% of groups do not have any recorded attacks 
over their lifetime. However, many groups are short-lived, and the proportion that do not 
carry out any terrorist attacks fall to less than 38% when we exclude groups active only in 
a single year. 50% of group-years include at least one terrorist attack.12 The distribution of 
attacks by year varies considerably, with some groups such as the Shining Path in Peru 
have hundreds of attacks, while other have no record of terrorism.  
Since definitions of terrorism are disputed, we use two operationalizations with 
different event inclusion criteria. The most inclusive is the GTD definition covering all 
events that satisfy at least two of the criteria in the GDT codebook - i.e., 1) the act must be 
aimed at attaining a political, religious, or social goal; 2) there must be evidence of an 
intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or 
audiences) than the immediate victims; 3) the action must be outside the context of 
legitimate warfare activities (pp. 8-9).  A more restrictive version requires that events 
satisfy all three criteria, and excludes all attacks against military targets, even if classified 
by the GTD as falling outside guerrilla warfare.  
                                                            
12 This is similar to the proportions found by Findley & Young (2012) for the geographical 
overlap of individual terrorist attacks and conflict zones. 
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We derive rebel-to-government troop-ratios data from Wood (2010) for 1989 to 
2009 and for the remaining years we use the Non-State Actor dataset (Cunningham et al. 
2009) and government military personnel from the Correlates of War National Material 
Capabilities Data. For government violence we use the categorical Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) ranging from 1 to 5 (Wood & Gibney 2010).13 We lag this by one year to guard 
against repression possibly responding to terrorism. We use data on media freedom from 
the Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press data (2013) and Van Belle’s (1995) media 
freedom index to generate a categorical variable ranging from 1 to 3, where higher 
numbers indicate less media freedom. 
To code the ideology of rebel organizations we use information from the 
ACD2EPR dataset, mapping conflict actors in ACD to ethnic groups in the Ethnic Power 
Relations data (Wucherpfenning et al. 2012), TOPs, and the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia. 
We see a fundamental distinction between ethno-nationalist groups with a specific ethnic 
claim and organizations seeking regime change without an ethnic affiliation. Other more 
specific categories identified include ethno-religious, religious, Marxist-socialist (leftist), 
right-wing, coups, and groups without a specific ideology and clearly stated goals. We 
include an ethno-religious category for groups where ethnic and religious claims coexist, 
such as Hamas. We code the ethnic/separatist claims as dominant in establishing a strong 
othering against rival communities for organizations combining ethnic or separatist claims 
with a particular political orientation, as in the case of the Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP) espousing a Marxist orientation, since leftist ideology mainly pertains 
to the type of government to be established after independence. In some conflicts we 
                                                            
13 We see the PTS as more appropriate than CIRI, since it also includes general repression 
against the population at large, including individuals not directly involved in dissent. 
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observe an evolution of rebel aims and ideology, for example in the Chechen conflict 
where religious motives have gradually achieved greater prominence. However, changes 
in aims or ideologies tend to be reflected in new rebel organizations rather than 
developments in existing groups, as when the secular Armed Forces of the Chechen 
Republic of Ichkeria gave way to the ethno-religious Gardens of the Righteous and the 
Caucasus Emirate. 
 
Typology of hard and soft targets 
In Table II we proceed from the informal discussion of soft and hard targets to an explicit 
operational definition based on the GTD target categories. We classify as hard-official all 
targets associated with the government and underpinning state control, including police 
and core infrastructure. By contrast, soft targets include all organizations and individuals 
with no official role in the state apparatus.  
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Table II in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
 
Figure 2 displays the proportion of hard-official targets as a rate of all targets (i.e., 
soft and hard) for all group years with at least one attack. Many groups attack exclusively 
hard or soft targets. Despite the emphasis on soft targets in popular commentary on 
terrorism, there is a slightly higher proportion of groups in civil war that exclusively attack 
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hard and official targets than only soft targets.14 However, many observations involve 
varying mixes of hard-official and soft targets. Looking only at counts of hard and soft 
targets separately is problematic as one cannot distinguish cases where counts are low 
because a group does not use terrorism at all and cases where groups only carry out 
attacks of the other type.  
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 2 in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 2: Distribution of proportion of hard targets 
 
Empirical results and discussion 
Table III summarizes the propositions and expectations developed above that we examine 
in the empirical analyses and the specific measures.15 To examine our propositions on 
terrorist attacks by specific non-state organizations we estimate a negative binomial on the 
number of terrorist attacks attributed to the group, with robust standard errors clustered on 
organizations. Table IV reports the results for the two inclusion criteria. The significant 
overdispersion parameter α indicates clustering. We focus on model 1 using the most 
inclusive definitions, as the results with the more restrictive definition are similar.  
                                                            
14 Groups that exclusively attack one type tend to have a relatively low number of attacks, 
and most groups with significant terrorist activity fall somewhere between the two 
extremes. 
15  In the empirical analysis we consider hard-official proportions with and without attacks 
against military targets. 
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Table IV in here 
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Stronger groups with a higher troop-ratio relative to the government are less likely 
to carry out terrorist attacks, consistent with our expectation that groups better equipped to 
rely on conventional attacks have fewer incentives use terrorist attacks intensively.  
Fighting a civil war against the government requires substantial resources and 
organization, our data on groups using in civil war already exclude many of the weakest 
terrorist organization who cannot muster resources to fight a civil war. Still, within this 
sample, the weakest groups in civil war are more likely to use terrorist tactics extensively, 
consistent with low capacity to carry out conventional attacks promoting terrorism and 
greater sensitivity by stronger groups to the potentially counterproductive effects of 
terrorism. 
The coefficient for Political Terror Scale is significant and positive. This is 
consistent with our claim that groups are more likely to use terrorism in civil wars where 
the government is more repressive and has a history of violence, since they face lower 
risks of losing support as their audience will be more permissive of terrorism. The 
proposition that greater media freedom can encourage organizations to use terrorist tactics 
in civil war is also supported, as we find a significant negative association between media 
freedom and the number terrorist attacks (note that the measure focuses on restrictions so 
that lower values indicate greater media freedom). 
To ensure that our results do not simply reflect the impact of other covariates 
potentially correlated both terrorism and with the main variables of interest we include a 
number of country and conflict-level controls. We include income and population size 
using data from Gleditsch (2002). Some argue that democracy can encourage terrorism 
(e.g., Li, 2005), and we include a dummy indicating whether a country has a Polity value 
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of seven or above 7, as media freedom is plausibly correlated with democracy (Jaggers & 
Gurr, 1995). We include the number or rebels in a civil war, as group competition may 
encourage terrorism (Bloom, 2004). We also include a measure of whether rebels have 
territorial control from the NSA data, as this could be associated with both group strength 
and incentives for terrorism. Finally, we include a measure of time since previous attack 
as well as its square and cube to control for possible non-linear time dependence.  
Figure 3 displays the implied marginal effects on the number of attacks for our key 
covariates of interest, holding other covariates at the median. The top panel shows that the 
predicted number of attacks falls by over 50% % - i.e., from over 8 to less than 4 - as the 
military strength of the rebels increase from the lowest troop ratio to a 2:1 rebels 
advantage. The superimposed density indicates that the median rebel troop ratio is very 
low (0.04). Consistent with our predictions, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland in 
India (<0.001 for most years) carries out a large number of attacks, while a strong group 
such as the National Islamic Movement in Afghanistan with a ratio well above 1 in 1990 
does not carry out any attacks. 
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 3 in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 3: Marginal effects on predicted attacks by troop ratio (top), PTS (middle), and media 
freedom (bottom) 
 
Since we hold the troop ratio at the low median value, the marginal effects for 
changes in repression or media freedom are relative to a high expected baseline number of 
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attacks. However, the middle panel in Figure 3 shows that predicted number of attacks 
increases by a factor of over 3 when we go from the lowest to the most repressive state on 
the Political Terror scale. For media freedom in the bottom panel of Figure 3, the 
predicted number attacks falls to less than 1/4 of the original number (e.g., from 20+ to 
about 5) as we go from the most free to the least free press.   
We now proceed to consider specific targets in terms of the proportion of hard 
targets for organizations with at least one attack as a function of ideology. Table V reports 
results using the regression for proportions estimator proposed by Papke & Wooldridge 
(1996) with four different definitions of targets, with robust standard errors. We also 
include the other covariates from our model of terrorist attacks to ensure that the findings 
for specific ideologies do not reflect other systematic features that go together with a 
higher proportion of hard-official targets. 
We focus on the first model 3 in Table V with the most inclusive definition, and 
note that the core results do not seem particularly sensitive to the specific definition of 
terrorism or model specification. The coefficients for the dummy variables for the distinct 
ideological profiles indicate the estimated differences compared to Marxist-socialist 
organizations as the reference category.16 The results indicate clear differences between 
ideologies. All the ideology terms have negative estimated coefficients, indicating a lower 
predicted proportion of hard-official targets than Marxist-socialist rebel groups, consistent 
with our claims based on the implications of differences in audiences and othering. 
Nationalist-separatist groups are notably less likely to attack hard-official targets, and 
ethno-religious and religious groups even less so. Groups with unclear ideology and 
                                                            
16 We do not include right wing groups as we have no cases in our data where such groups 
use terrorism and fight the government in a civil war. 
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groups that seek regime change not linked to a specific ethnic group also have large 
negative coefficients, but the estimates here are not significant. These categories include 
low numbers and more heterogeneous mixes. In practice, some non-leftist rebels seeking 
regime change recruit from marginalized ethnic groups, such as the Free Syrian Army in 
the Alawite-dominated Assad regime in Syria. Thus, is not surprising that their targeting 
strategy is less consistently selective than Marxist-socialist groups. Save for the positive 
effect of population we find less consistent results for the predictors from the attack 
models, although democracy and repression have a marginally significant negative effects 
on the proportion of hard targets in some models while territorial control is a positive with 
the restrictive definition of terrorism.  
 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Table V in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
 
 
Figure 4 plots the implied predicted proportions of hard-official targets by ideology 
profiles based on Model 3 in Table IV, holding other features at the median. The groups 
are listed in decreasing order by the predicted proportions. For leftists groups we expect 
that over 2/3s of the attacks will be against hard-official targets. Organizations become 
increasingly less likely to attack hard targets as the audience becomes more exclusive and 
group boundaries are stronger. As expected, religious organizations are the most likely to 
attack soft targets, and have a predicted proportion hard targets less than 50%. Although 
models with more restrictive measures of hard-official targets and different control 
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variables can change the absolute proportions, they do not significantly change the relative 
group rankings.  
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 4 in here 
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 
Figure 4: Predicted proportion of hard targets by group ideology 
 
We have considered a number of potential challenges to our results. We show in a 
supplementary appendix that the main results for attacks and targeting remain consistent 
across different terrorism operationalizations and specifications, including controls for 
ideology, external support, number of ongoing conflicts, and fixed effects in the count 
model, and number of groups in the proportions model.  
Skeptics may wonder if our findings on repression reflect that high terrorist 
activity generates repressive state responses rather than helping to justify terrorism. If so, 
then we should see a stronger relationship between terrorism and leading values of 
repression than lagged values. We find no evidence that that is the case, and government 
repression does not systematically increase following terrorist activity during a civil war.17 
                                                            
17 In most civil wars, government repression clearly pre-dates the introduction of terrorist 
campaigns. In the Guatemalan civil war, for example, we only see systematic terrorist 
activity by the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) from 1987, 5 years 
after the UCDP start date, after government repression was already present. We do not 
observe notable changes in repression during or after terrorist campaigns.  
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Group-level analyses of terrorism help capture organizational characteristics, but 
can be sensitive to problems arising from unclaimed attacks and unknown perpetrators. 
We consider a number of additional tests to examine the robustness of our findings to 
unclaimed attacks. We overlay the geo-coded location for GTD attacks with the civil war 
polygons from the Conflict Site data (Hallberg 2012) to compare the number of attacks 
claimed by rebel groups in civil war and attacks with an unknown perpetrator for each 
conflict-polygon-year.18  In general, most conflicts have more claimed than unclaimed 
attacks. For the majority of conflict years in our sample the number of claimed attacks by 
actors in civil war exceeds, or is similar to, the number of unclaimed attacks. This is all 
the more telling since we do not consider all claimed attacks, in particular those by actors 
not currently involved in civil war. The median proportions of hard and official targets are 
also strikingly similar for claimed and unclaimed attacks. Balance tests indicate almost 
identical distributions for the number of attacks against soft and hard-official targets for 
claimed and unclaimed events, and it seems unlikely that groups strategically claim certain 
types of attacks. The proportion of hard and official targets for claimed and unclaimed 
attacks turns out to be almost identical for conflicts where we observe a large number of 
unclaimed attacks, reinforcing our main results.19 
                                                            
18 The supplementary appendix demonstrates the overlay approach for Guatemala and 
Northern Ireland. The Conflict Sites Data limit the analysis to events over the period 
1989-2011, and we cannot include some GTD attacks without geo-coded location.  
19  The only cases with larger differences in targeting patterns between claimed and 
unclaimed attacks tend to be conflicts with few unclaimed attacks (e.g. El Salvador and 
Northern Ireland) or conflicts where we would expect to see greater restraint and in line 
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To examine whether reporting biases could influence the results for media freedom 
we compare the distribution of claimed and unclaimed terrorist attacks across varying 
media freedom. The distribution of reported unclaimed attacks is remarkably similar 
across levels of media freedom, whereas claimed attacks increase with free media. 
Moreover, the highest frequencies of unclaimed attacks per year are observed in countries 
with completely controlled media. If inflated reporting were driving our results we should 
see higher records for all attacks, including unclaimed with media freedom. The increase 
in claimed attacks is consistent with our argument about how media freedom influences 
incentives for attacks.  
Finally, it may be contended that the effect of ideology on target selection should 
be conditional on military strength. In particular, the greater permissiveness for terrorist 
attacks on civilians may apply primarily to militarily weaker ethno-nationalist groups as 
stronger groups have generally fewer incentives to use terrorism over conventional 
attacks. We do not find strong evidence for conditional effects in looking at proportions or 
even a general effect of troop ratios, but this may arise in part from the difficulties in 
distinguishing relative target preferences and incentives to use terrorist tactics since the 
analysis leaves out all groups that do not use terrorism. Testing the overall allocation of 
efforts to indirect and direct targets will require more detailed cross-national data on 
individual conventional attacks within ongoing civil war not available in existing sources.  
 
Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
with our expectation have a higher proportion of hard and official targets for unclaimed 
than claimed attacks. 
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The fact that some actors in civil wars use terrorism intensively while others do not calls 
for explanations grounded in the rationale or incentives of actors to use terrorist tactics as 
well as the most helpful targets. We provide the first actor-focused and group-specific 
analysis of terrorist frequency and targeting in civil war. The results are consistent with 
our claim that terrorist tactics in civil war are chosen when they can help rebel groups 
improve their effectiveness relative to conventional warfare, lower the costs of fighting for 
the rebels, and increase the costs imposed on the government. In sum, although many 
highlight the differences between terrorist attacks and conventional warfare, terrorism is a 
tactic with a clear political logic in civil wars. Terrorist attacks can also deny the 
government the control of violence and be important for the evolution of conflicts and 
decisive for their final outcomes. Wood (2003), for example, argues that it was the broader 
economic consequences of the conflict in El Salvador, arising in part due from terrorism 
and irregular warfare, rather than the rebels conventional fighting, that eventually led 
elites to pressure the government for a settlement.  
Beyond the quantity of terrorism or number of attacks, our approach also speaks to 
the quality or specific targeting strategy. Rebel groups differ considerably in terrorist 
targeting strategies. We argue that these differences rest on the political logic of group 
ideologies and audiences in terms of the implied benefits and costs of specific targets and 
their relationship with rebels’ need for popular support. Group ideology, goals, and 
civilian constituencies can either constrain rebels to use terrorism selectively or widen the 
range of legitimate targets to entire populations. 
More generally, our findings underscore the utility of an actor-centered perspective 
on tactic choice in political violence, and the central role of combatant ideologies, identity, 
and motivation in influencing wartime behavior, responses to government 
counterterrorism, and patterns of civilian support (see Lyall et al., 2013; Miller, 2007; Toft 
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& Zhukov, 2014). Paradoxically, we currently have more comprehensive data on 
individual terrorist events or indirect targeting than conventional attacks in civil war. 
However, future global and systematic analyses will be facilitated by the expansion of 
data on events in civil war, including the Uppsala Georeferenced Event Data (GED, 
currently available only for Africa and Southeast Asia) and developments in automated 
event data (see Kearing, 2013; Sundberg et al., 2013).  
Our research suggests a number of potentially promising extensions and topics for 
future research. Our framework here looks only at instantaneous tactical choice, but in 
practice there can be important differences and trade-offs in the short and long-term 
consequences of terrorist attacks. For example, terrorism can help promote a small group 
and facilitate recruitment in the short-run, but may become relative less attractive in the 
long-run as groups grow and become more concerned over the potential negative 
consequences. The organization of smaller cells for terrorist attacks may also make 
organizations more vulnerable to splinter groups and concerns over the ability of rebels to 
control violence in peace processes. More can also be done to examine interactions with 
governments and how their countermeasures influences targeting as well as force-
allocation potential dilemmas of force allocation. An actor oriented perspective can also 
help understand other tactics outside violent coercion and prospects for settlements. 
Indeed, most contentious organizations engage in a wide range of political strategies other 
than terrorism and conventional warfare, including political wings (if feasible), and 
possibly direct negotiations with governments. Although these issues are not easy to 
investigate with the available data, our core theoretical perspective provides a useful way 
to consider predictions about the type of group profiles and actor interactions where non-
violent strategies and feasible settlements should be more or less likely.  
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Replication data 
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this article can be found at 
http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets. 
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Table IA: Group goals and implied audience 
 A. Goals B. Audience 
i) Government: group seeks to change the 
government 
ii) Secession: group seeks secession for a 
territory or autonomy/concessions for a 
specific ethnic group 
iii) Other: groups with unclear goals, e.g., 
foreign supported groups, rent-seeking  
i) Inclusive: group seeks to reach out to all 
individuals, without significant communal 
differences 
ii) Exclusive-Ethnic: group seeks to reach out 
only to a specific ethnic group 
iii) Exclusive-Religious: group seeks to reach 
out to true believers 
iv) Undefined: group does not specify domestic 
constituency (e.g., mainly driven by foreign 
support or looting) 
 
 
  
Table IB: Terrorist group ideologies by goals (A) and audience (B), ordered alphabetically 
a) Ethno-nationalist: advocate secession or autonomy/concessions for particular groups 
(A.ii), and have an exclusive-ethnic audience (B.ii). Ethnic identification creates strong 
othering against government and associated individuals, which makes it easier to justify 
attacks on soft targets outside the constituency. 
b) Ethno-religious: advocate secession or autonomy/concessions for particular groups 
(A.ii), and have an exclusive ethnic (B.iii) and exclusive religious (B.iii) audience. They 
differ from ethno-nationalism in the emphasis on religion and true believers. This induces 
strong othering against government and non-believers, and wide scope to justify attacks. 
c) Marxist/Socialist: aims to take over the government (A.i), and have an inclusive 
audience (B.i). Government targets have high symbolic value. Weak othering, since no 
fascriptive identities. 
d) No ideology: terrorist groups with unclear motives (A.iii) and undefined audiences 
(B.iv). The symbolic value of government targets is low without a clear motivating 
ideology and the counterproductive effects of civilian targeting are also minimal in the 
absence of a constituency. Thus, such groups are more likely to attack soft targets. 
e) Regime change: aims to take over the government, not clearly leftist or rightist (A.i). 
The audience is typically inclusive (B.i). Government targets have high symbolic value. 
Weak othering, since no ascriptive identities. 
f) Religious: seeks to seize and reorganize the state along religious lines (A.i), sometimes 
in larger supranational states. The audience is exclusive-religious (B.iii), leading to 
stronger othering and permissiveness in attacking soft targets.  
g) Right-wing/Coups: aims to take over the government or keep the status quo (A.i), and 
inclusive audience (B.i). Government targets have high symbolic value. Weak othering, 
since no ascriptive identities. 
 
 
 
  
Table II: Typology of hard and soft targets 
Hard and Official Targets Soft Civilian Targets 
Government (general and diplomatic) Business 
Police Educational institutions 
Transportation Journalists and Media 
Telecommunications NGOs 
Utilities  Private Citizens and Property 
Food and water supply Religious Figures/Institutions 
Maritime Tourists 
Airports/ aircrafts (excluding hijacking) Other (e.g., ambulances, refugee camps) 
(Military)  
 
  
Table III: Summary of propositions, measures, and expectations  
Proposition Measure Expectation 
   
Attack frequency 
 
  
Militarily weaker rebels carry out 
a larger number of attacks 
 
Rebel/(rebel + government) 
troops 
- 
Higher government repression 
increases terrorist attacks 
 
Political Terror Scale + 
Higher media freedom increases 
terrorist attacks 
Media freedom index (inverse 
scale) 
- 
   
Proportion hard targets 
 
  
Universal ideologies with large 
audiences more likely to attack 
hard/official targets  
 
Nationalist-separatist and ethno-
religious ideologies with narrow 
audiences less likely to attack 
hard/official targets than 
universalist 
 
Religious groups more likely to 
attack soft targets 
Group ideologies: Marxist-
socialist (MS), nationalist-
separatists (NS), ethno-religious 
(ER), religious (R), regime 
change (RC), no ideology (NI) 
MS|RC> NS>(ER)>(R|NI) 
 
 
  
Table IV: Negative Binomial Regression. Terrorist attacks 
(1) Inclusive definition  (2) Most restrictive definition  
Troop ratio  -0.406*  -0.437*  
(0.186)  (0.183)  
  
Repression t-1  0.690*** 0.659*** 
(0.146)  (0.145)  
  
Media freedom  -0.805*** -0.791*** 
(0.191)  (0.189)  
  
Territorial control  -0.172  -0.130  
(0.157)  (0.145)  
  
Number of rebel groups -0.759*** -0.697*** 
(0.102)  (0.102)  
  
Ln GDP pc  0.214  0.188  
(0.160)  (0.150)  
  
Ln population  -0.273**  -0.249*  
(0.105)  (0.103)  
  
Democracy  0.640*  0.556*  
(0.262)  (0.262)  
  
Time since last attack -1.134*** -1.040*** 
(0.123)  (0.134)  
  
Time^2  0.109*** 0.0915*** 
(0.0238)  (0.0264)  
  
Time^3  -0.00285*  -0.00213+  
(0.00111)  (0.00125)  
  
Constant  4.409*  3.987*  
(2.014)  (1.934)  
Log α 1.394*** 1.417*** 
(0.111)  (0.112)  
 
Observations  1571  1571  
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
  
  
Table V: Regression for proportions, hard and soft targets 
(3) Inclusive def.  (4) Inclusive def.  (5) Restrictive def.  (6) Restrictive def.  
Nationalist-separatist -0.387*  -0.362*  -0.447**  -0.416*  
(0.170)  (0.182)  (0.171)  (0.179)  
  
Ethno-religious  -0.553**  -0.529**  -0.561**  -0.462*  
(0.193)  (0.200)  (0.208)  (0.216)  
  
Religious  -0.838*  -0.745*  -0.985**  -0.795*  
(0.333)  (0.352)  (0.330)  (0.349)  
  
No ideology  -0.624+  -0.581  -0.359  -0.256  
(0.347)  (0.358)  (0.337)  (0.340)  
  
Regime change  -0.450  -0.387  0.206  0.229  
(0.493)  (0.520)  (0.562)  (0.662)  
  
Democracy  -0.385  -0.368  -0.503*  -0.468+  
(0.236)  (0.229)  (0.244)  (0.244)  
  
Repression  -0.143+  -0.138+  -0.0201  -0.0357  
(0.0743)  (0.0780)  (0.0837)  (0.0882)  
  
Media freedom  -0.0234  -0.0448  -0.0284  -0.0530  
(0.119)  (0.118)  (0.109)  (0.110)  
  
Troop ratio  -0.00347  -0.0305  -0.0884  -0.118  
(0.151)  (0.156)  (0.149)  (0.155)  
  
Ln GDP pc  0.0569  0.0755  0.0153  0.0332  
(0.0915)  (0.0885)  (0.0945)  (0.0931)  
  
Ln population  0.0949+  0.0951+  0.185**  0.191**  
(0.0541)  (0.0525)  (0.0594)  (0.0587)  
  
Rebel ext. support  0.110  0.0418  
(0.151)  (0.152)  
  
Territorial control  0.0547  0.145+  
(0.0797)  (0.0775)  
  
Constant  -0.0296  -0.285  -1.443  -1.747  
(1.179)  (1.134)  (1.248)  (1.193)  
Observations  821  810  765  754  
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 
  
 Figure 1: Bargaining, weak vs strong rebels and conventional military strategy m vs. terrorist 
strategy t 
  
 Figure 2: Distribution of proportion of hard targets 
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Figure 3: Marginal effects on predicted attacks by troop ratio (top), PTS (middle), and media freedom 
(bottom) 
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Figure 4: Predicted proportion of hard targets by group ideology 
 
 
